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ow do we characterize the current era in US health care?
Perhaps “a time of increasing costs and decreasing
health insurance”. Equally accurate would be “the age of
specialism”. Hospitals have reorganized into specialty service
lines;
1 profitable specialist-owned surgicenters, endoscopy
units, and imaging centers have multiplied;
2 market-dominant
single-specialty groups can negotiate high fees from commer-
cial insurers.
3 The gap between the income of many specialists
and that of primary care physicians is wide and growing wider,
leading a growing number of US medical school graduates to
avoid primary care careers.
4
Who is responsible? In most developed nations, the govern-
ment has a policy that supports primary care as a vibrant
foundation for their health care system. The United States, in
contrast, has no primary care policy and for decades has
relegated physician compensation and workforce planning to
the private market and the (specialist-rich) medical profession
and academic medical community.
In this issue, Lasser et al. demonstrate that governmental
payments are, in large part, responsible for the specialist–
generalist income gap.
5 Moreover, Medicare’s physician payment
structure forms the basis for private insurer fees. If government
payment structures, related to the lack of a governmental
primary care policy, are responsible for the growing crisis in
primary care, it follows that the government—in particular the
federal government—is capable of fixing the problem.
How might the federal government invest in a robust
primary care sector? Six proposals come to mind.
1. Reforming the CMS-RUC nexus
Fee-for-service Medicare assigns each physician-provided
service a relative value unit (RVU) and multiplies the RVU
by a monetary conversion factor (CF) to derive the approved
fee. For example, in 2007 a 99214 complex primary care
visit had a RVU of 2.58, while a colonoscopy enjoyed a RVU
of 5.84. Multiplying by the 2007 Medicare CF of 37.9, the
primary care visit garners an average Medicare fee of
$97.78 while the average colonoscopy is worth $221.34;
both services take about 30 minutes of physician time. In
the early 1990s, RVU values were set by the Resource
Based Relative Value Scale system (RBRVS) and are
updated every 5 years by a committee of the American
Medical Association (AMA) and specialty societies—the
Relative Value Scale Update Committee (RUC)—which
recommends RVU revisions to the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS). While primary care physi-
cians provide about half of Medicare physician visits, they
compose 15% of the RUC’s voting members.
4 The RUC and
CMS perpetuate the inequity between undervalued cogni-
tive and overvalued procedural/imaging payment.
6
The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC),
an independent agency that advises Congress on Medicare,
asserts that CMS relies too heavily on the physician specialty
societies which participate in the RUC.
6 In its March 2008
report, MedPAC recommended that CMS establish a group of
experts separate from the RUC—including members who do
not personally benefit from Medicare payment rates—to
identify overvalued services.
6
The Oregon Medical Association (OMA) recently passed a
resolution calling for 1) the RUC to make primary care
voting representation at least equal to the proportion of
primary care physicians in the workforce and 2) the AMA to
work with the RUC to address fair primary care compensa-
tion. In 2007, the AMA House of Delegates referred OMA’s
resolution to the AMA Board of Trustees, who subsequently
authored a report supporting the work of the RUC and
maintaining that “the RUC was designed to be an expert
panel, rather than a representative committee.”
7 In 2007
the RUC reviewed a proposal for one new primary care seat
but concluded that the RUC’s current expertise was suffi-
cient to competently review RVU values.
Over the years, CMS has accepted almost all RUC
recommendations; thus, it is as responsible—if not more
so—for the gaping imbalance between cognitive and
procedural/imaging service values. Congress or CMS
could address the dominance of the RUC on physician
payment. Policy reformers concerned with the impact of
the primary care-specialty income gap on the threatened
primary care physician workforce might do better to focus
their energies on Congress and CMS rather than to work
through the AMA.
2. Splitting the SGR
In 1997, Congress created the sustainable growth rate
(SGR) formula to control Medicare spending by setting
yearly targets for total Medicare physician expenditures.
8
Each year, if total physician expenditures exceed the
target for that year, the SGR mandates Congress to reduce
the conversion factor (CF) in order to bring Medicare
physician spending back into line. Pressured by the
physician lobby, Congress has repeatedly overridden the
SGR targets, preventing reductions of the CF and allowing
rapid increases in physician expenditures. Advocates of
fiscal restraint counter that stringent enforcement of the Published online August 1, 2008
1539SGR is needed to keep Medicare solvent. Lost in this
debate is an appreciation of how the SGR approach
exacerbates the gap between primary care and specialist
earnings.
How does SGR penalize primary care? Physician ser-
vices can be divided into two groups: evaluation and
management (E&M) services (most commonly primary
care office visits) and non-E&M services, including surgi-
cal, diagnostic (e.g., colonoscopy), and imaging (e.g., CT
scans) procedures mostly billed by specialists. The SGR
applies a single CF to all physician services. But the
volume of non-E&M services has grown far more rapidly
that the volume of E&M services, enriching specialists
and, in 2006, accounting for 86% of physician payment
overruns above the SGR target.
9 The number of office
visits for established Medicare patients increased by 12%
from 2000 to 2005, while the number of Medicare-billed
colonoscopies increased by 40%, and CT scans by 65%.
4
With SGR using one CF for all services, primary care
physicians are penalized when large increases in spending
for specialized services drive down—or keep flat—the CF
applied to E&M and non-E&M services alike.
What if Congress created two SGR pools, one for E&M
and the other for non-E&M services? In this scenario, the
CF for each pool would rise or fall based on expenditure
trends within that pool. The split SGR would hold
procedural and imaging specialists responsible for the
volume growth of their services; the non-E&M CF would go
down if the non-E&M pool overspends, while the E&M CF
would go up if cognitive services continue slow volume
growth. This proposal not only helps primary care reim-
bursement; it also puts a brake on Medicare physician
expenditures by delivering consequences (a lower CF) for
specialist procedural and imaging overspending. A de-
tailed proposal for a split SGR was published in a recent
Health Affairs blog: "Splitting Medicare’s Sustainable
Growth Rate: A Proposal to Strengthen Medicare and
Primary Care."
9
3. Upward adjustment of primary care fees
MedPAC has floated the idea of maintaining the RBRVS
and SGR systems intact, but making an upward adjust-
ment of fees for cognitive primary care services. This would
tilt Medicare payment toward primary care and (because
the SGR is a fixed pie—if the primary care slice increases,
the specialist portion shrinks) away from specialist-
provided procedural and imaging services.
10
4. New primary care payments
Primary care payment could be increased through a blend of
visit-based fees and other reimbursement modes, for exam-
ple, care coordination payments for patients with complex
healthcare needs. MedPAC recommended that a care coordi-
nation payment be added to the physician fee schedule to
compensate physicians for the between-visit time spent on
coordinating care.
11 The Geriatric Assessment and Chronic
Care Coordination Act of 2007, supported by over 30
professional and consumer organizations, has also proposed
a care coordination payment for Medicare patients.
5. Elimination of fee-for-service primary care payment
RBRVS and SGR reform assume the continuation of fee-
for-service payment for primary care. A more profound
reform involves the elimination of visit-based fee-for-service
primary care payment and its replacement by a comprehen-
sive per patient payment that is risk adjusted and combined
with substantial performance-based rewards (using patient
experience and clinical measures) to encourage quality and
access. This comprehensive payment for comprehensive
care proposal would pay considerably more than the capita-
tion payments common in the 1990s.
12 The proposal argues
that primary care payment should not be visit-based
because care coordination takes place between visits, and
phone/e-mail/Web encounters should be provided as alter-
natives to face-to-face visits. Commercial insurers are being
approached to pilot-test this payment reform.
6. The “patient-centered medical home”
According to this popular concept, primary care practices
that can demonstrate certain features (e.g., electronic
medical records, a registry to track clinical measures,
coordination of care, prompt access to care, and other
improvements) would be designated as medical homes and
rewarded with increased reimbursement. The National Com-
mittee on Quality Assurance has created criteria for medical
home designation. In 2006, Congress authorized Medicare
medical home demonstrations, requiring Medicare to orga-
nize medical home projects in up to eight states. Thirty state
Medicaid programs have expressed interest in promoting
medical homes. Commercial health plans in several states
have joined forces to pilot new payment modes for medical
home-designated practices. Large employers, national health
insuranceplans,andprimarycareprofessionalsocietieshave
organized a Patient Centered Primary Care Collaborative
seeking to strengthen primary care through the medical
home concept.
13 Precisely how reimbursement might change
for a medical home-designated practice will vary depending
on the payer (Medicare, Medicaid, or commercial insurer).
Small primary care practices cannot by themselves ac-
complish the triple aim of the medical home: enhancing
the patient experience of care, improving the health of
populations, and reducing per capita costs. Only through
structures that integrate small practices with one another
and with specialists, hospitals and home care services,
can the medical home vision become a reality.
14
In conclusion, it appears that the United States has been
inching toward a primary care policy over the past 2 years. An
impending primary care practitioner shortage is widely recog-
nized. The decreasing ability of patients to find a new primary
care practice, or to get a timely primary care appointment, is
making headlines. Employers finally understand the virtues of a
strong primary care foundation to the health care system. The
Government Accountability Office, which advises Congress on
policy issues, testified in 2008 that a strong primary care-based
system offers higher quality and lower costs, arguing that the
current undervaluing of primary care is harmful.
15
Talk, however, is cheap. Since, as Lasser et al. demonstrate,
the government is largely responsible for primary care’s
1540 Bodenheimer et al.: Narrowing the specialist–generalist income gap JGIMdoldrums, then the government should step up to the plate and
do something about it. The six concrete proposals discussed
here would be steps in the right direction. Ultimately, the
United States needs to join other developed nations in pro-
claiming a primary care policy to the effect that “The federal
government will take all necessary steps—including payment
reform and physician workforce planning—to ensure that a
robust primary care sector thrives as the foundation of US
health care.”
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